

Choosing China's Leaders

**Edited by
Chien-wen Kou and Xiaowei Zang**

First published 2014
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2014 Chien-wen Kou and Xiaowei Zang

The right of the editor to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Choosing China's leaders / edited by Chien-Wen Kou and Xiaowei Zang.

pages cm. – (Routledge studies on China in transition ; 46)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Political leadership—China. 2. China—Politics and government. 3. Elite (Social science)—China. I. Kou, Jianwen, 1964-, editor of compilation. II. Zang, Xiaowei, editor of compilation.

JQ1516.C46 2013

320.951—dc23

2013007160

ISBN: 978-0-415-81947-3 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-203-37450-4 (ebk)

Typeset in Times New Roman
by Taylor & Francis Books

7 The Rise of Youth League Affiliates and their Paths to the Top

Chien-wen Kou

Introduction

In the past decade, the Youth League group (*Tuanpai*, 团派) has become an important group in Chinese elite politics. However, up until now, a comprehensive analysis of Youth League affiliates has remained absent and many questions regarding them unanswered. What are the attributes of their mobility patterns? What factors are crucial to their rise? To what extent does this elite group differ from other factions? Will its political influence continue in the post-Hu era? This chapter answers these questions by analyzing 293 ranking cadres with Youth League backgrounds.

This chapter identifies two attributes in the political mobility of Youth League affiliates. First, they seldom obtained rank promotion by assuming leading posts in ministries relevant to technology, science, planning, trade, management, finance, and economics. This finding echoes the dual elite recruitment paths argument. Second, Youth League affiliates have a strong competitive advantage in age. They assume leading posts at the bureau or ministerial ranks at a relatively young age. This advantage gives them a much longer period to wait for their next rank promotion. These attributes indicate an aspect of “sponsored mobility” in Chinese elite politics.

This chapter further argues that both connections to the top leadership and the institutional role of the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) as a cadre transmission belt to the party-state are crucial to the political rise of Youth League affiliates. While connections are essential to all factions, the institutional factor can be found only in the Youth League group. This makes this elite group different from other factions and bureaucratic systems (*xitong*, 系统). Many young and potential cadres are constantly sent to the leading posts of the CCYL where they develop nation-wide connections during their tenures. After leaving the CCYL, they are legally transferred to other branches of the party-state. Consequently, in contrast with the decline of political influence of other factions after their factional leaders step down, the political influence of this elite group is more likely to continue. This chapter expects that the Youth League group will remain active in Chinese elite politics after the 18th Party Congress in 2012, irrespective of changes in the Chinese

Communist Party's (CCP) central leadership. The strong evidence demonstrated by this chapter is that many potential young ranking cadres (those born in the 1960s) belong to this group, in addition to their Youth League fellows in the fifth generation leadership.

This chapter is composed of four parts. The first part addresses the organizational structure of the CCYL, the definition of Youth League affiliates and the sources of data. The second part identifies the upward mobility patterns of Youth League elites in terms of promotion channels and average ages. The third part of this chapter indicates that Hu Jintao's (胡锦涛) seizure of the position of CCP General Secretary is insufficient to explain the rise of Youth League affiliates over the past two decades. The institutional role of the CCYL must be taken into account. Following this same rationale, the last part of this chapter illustrates that the political weight of the Youth League group is most likely to continue in the years to come. Some promising political stars in this elite group will be identified.

Organizational structure, definition, and sources of data

The CCYL was founded in the 1920s and has undergone several name changes over its 90-year history. In 1966, due to the impact of the Cultural Revolution, the CCYL's operations were halted. The CCYL rebuilt its provincial committees under the order of the CCP in 1973 and elected a new central leadership in 1978. From then on, the CCYL has held its national congress every five years to elect a new central leadership.

According to the CCP Charter and the CCYL Charter, the CCYL is the CCP's assistant and reserve force. This sets the parameters of the CCYL's institutional role in the existing political establishment. The CCYL has two organizational missions: first, echoing and executing the party's policy line and managing youth affairs on behalf of the government;¹ second, providing a training ground for promising young cadres and channeling many of them to other branches of the party-state at various levels after several years.² Accordingly, the CCYL is a quasi-state institution and a major supplier of young reserve cadres. Its cadres also form part of the party-state's cadre ranks.³

The CCYL is a gigantic nationwide organization with a structure similar to that of the CCP. At the central level are the National Congress, the Central Committee, the Standing Committee, the Secretariat, and various functional departments and direct units (*zhishu danwei*, 直属单位). A similar structure is duplicated down to the grass roots level in all provinces, as well as in the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the People's Armed Police (PAP), the CCP, the government, central finance organs and central state-owned enterprises. By the end of 2007, the CCYL boasted a membership of 75.439 million and the number of its full-time cadres reached 193,000.⁴

The CCYL Central Committee is under the leadership of the CCP Central Committee.⁵ The candidate for CCYL first secretary is hand-picked by the

top leader of the CCP.⁶ The CCYL Secretariat is the League's decision-making core. In the interim of the CCYL Central Committee and Standing Committee meetings, the Secretariat acts with the authority of the Central Committee to oversee the League's daily operations. The CCYL committees at and under the provincial levels are under the dual leadership of the CCP committees at the same level and the CCYL committees at one level higher. The appointment, transfer and dismissal of leading CCYL cadres should be approved primarily by the CCP committees at the same level with the assistance of the CCYL committees at the same level or one level higher, depending on the rank level of CCYL posts.⁷ In practice, the CCYL committees usually accept the CCP committees' decisions in the personnel arrangements of their leading cadres.⁸

Regarding cadre management, the CCYL sets the age limits of its own cadres at all levels. For instance, in the CCYL Secretariat, secretaries are normally under the age of 45, and those aged in their late thirties should make up half of the Secretariat. Heads and deputies of CCYL central functional departments should not be older than 40. In CCYL provincial committees, in general, the secretaries should not exceed the age of 40, their deputies are not supposed to be older than 38, and at least one or two cadres should be under the age of 35.⁹ Those who reach the age limits are usually transferred to posts in another branch of the party-state.

After a brief description of the CCYL's organizational structure and cadre management, this section moves to discuss the definition of Youth League affiliates and the sources of data. In this chapter, Youth League affiliates are defined as civilian cadres who have occupied a CCYL post ranking at the deputy-bureau level (*fujuji*, 副局长级) or above as their full-time job after 1978 and have advanced to the vice-ministerial rank (*fubuji*, 副部长级) or higher before retirement. The CCYL posts to be included are CCYL first secretary, CCYL executive secretary, CCYL Secretariat members, heads and deputies of the CCYL central functional departments and direct units, secretaries and vice secretaries of the CCYL provincial committees and other committees equivalent to this level, and secretaries of the CCYL sub-provincial city (*fushengji shi*, 副省级市) committees. This rigorous definition leaves out many cadres who may be counted as Youth League affiliates by other studies, and will obviously reduce the number of persons under study.¹⁰

There are three reasons for formulating this rigorous definition. First, ranking cadres are easier to identify and their biographies are generally available and more complete. Second, this group of Youth League affiliates are those "who advanced their careers through the Chinese Communist Youth League."¹¹ They hold key posts in the CCYL and thus became officials with a mid-level or higher rank at an age much younger than cadres at the same level in other branches of the party-state. Due to their full-time jobs in the CCYL, they are also more likely to develop close personal connections and a sense of group identification—both of which are crucial to the formation of factions—via shared working experiences and frequent contacts.¹²

Third, this chapter excludes those Youth League fellows in the PLA and the PAP and those who served in the CCYL from 1973 to 1978. The exclusion of officers from this chapter is because their performance assessment and personnel assignment are unilaterally decided by the PLA and the PAP. The CCYL has no authority to be involved in their career development. Accordingly, the promotion patterns of these officers are independent of their civilian counterparts. Of those PLA and PAP representatives in the CCYL, only Song Defu (宋德福) is included because he left the military and pursued a civilian political career. Additionally, a number of young cadres holding Youth League leading posts between 1973–78 were supporters of the Cultural Revolution. They were removed from their posts or even sentenced to prison by the end of 1978. Their career patterns are largely different from those who were assigned to CCYL posts after 1978.

The biographical data of this study are drawn from these sources: (1) Zhonggong zhengzhi jingying ziliaoku (the Chinese Political Elites Database, 中共政治菁英资料库) (<http://ics.nccu.edu.tw/chinaleaders/index.htm>), constructed and operated by the author since December 2003; (2) official websites of the central and provincial governments; (3) *Baidu Baike* (Baidu Encyclopedia, 百度百科) (<http://baike.baidu.com/>); (4) official websites of the *People's Daily* (<http://edu.people.com.cn>) and Xinhua News Agency (<http://www.xinhuanet.com>). The biographical data were last updated in April 2011. Despite time-consuming efforts to compile a full list of Youth League affiliates, such searches are by no means exhaustive, and the possibility of missing a few members still exists. In addition, some biographical histories are incomplete due to the unavailability of information.

Upward-mobility patterns: promotion channels and average ages

Elite recruitment, including both eligibility for elite status and selection to specific elite positions, is crucial to the lasting stability of a political system.¹³ It reflects the dominant political values of the political system, particularly the preferences of the screening institutions and the distribution of political influence among social groups. Elite recruitment also affects avenues for political participation and status by making certain credentials and resources more important than others, while also affecting the stability of the system.¹⁴ By examining the upward-mobility patterns of Youth League affiliates, this chapter supports the argument of elite dualism – dual elite recruitment paths for achieving dual regime goals, namely maintaining one party rule and pushing economic modernization – and indicates the competitive advantage of this elite group in age.

Promotion channels

The first part of this section focuses on the mobility channels of Youth League affiliates. Promotion channels are classified into six kinds: (1) the CCP

organs,¹⁵ (2) mass organizations,¹⁶ (3) provincial leaders,¹⁷ (4) People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (PC/CPPCC),¹⁸ (5) professional ministries relevant to technology, science, management, planning, trade, finance and economics in the State Council, and (6) the other ministries in the State Council. This chapter divides ministries in the State Council into two types for the sake of understanding the dual mobility paths of technocrats and political bureaucrats.¹⁹ The ranks to be examined are vice-ministerial and full-ministerial levels (*zhengbuji*, 正部级).²⁰ If one holds two posts simultaneously, only the position with the higher rank or with stronger political importance (party and government posts) is counted.

As Table 7.1 shows, when advancing to the vice-ministerial rank, 46.3 percent of the 283 persons went through the CCP organ channel. From 1983 to 2007, the percentages held steady at 47 percent or above. 25.4 percent received rank promotions through the provincial leader channel. 23 persons (8.1 percent) took advantage of the mass organization channel, 15 of which were CCYL executive secretaries. Another 13.4 percent obtained their first vice-ministerial level post via the PC/CPPCC channel. 16 out of 31 (51.6 percent) cadres who obtained rank promotions in the period of 2008–11 took advantage of this channel. They obtained rank promotions through this channel primarily because they, serving in the League in the 1980s and 1990s, were increasingly approaching the mandatory retirement age in the late 2000s and were thereby transferred to a politically less important post with a higher rank.

Youth League affiliates seldom went through the channel of technological and economic ministries. Only 3 out of the 283 persons (1.1 percent) were appointed to a leadership position in a ministry related to technology, science, trade, management, finance, or economics in the past three decades.²¹ In fact, few Youth League affiliates have ever held a post at the deputy-bureau level or above in these professional departments and state-owned enterprises of various administrative levels, regardless of their educational backgrounds.²²

Table 7.2 demonstrates the mobility paths of Youth League affiliates to the full-ministerial level. Apparently, the provincial leader channel has become the most important channel for Youth League affiliates. 39.5 percent of the 81 persons were appointed to be governors or provincial party secretaries, while 21 percent got rank promotions via the PC/CPPCC channel. They were appointed as the general secretaries of the National People's Congress or of the national committee of the CPPCC, the heads of provincial CPPCCs or, on a few occasions, the heads of the provincial People's Congress. 12 persons (14.8 percent) went through the mass organization channel, eight of whom held the post of CCYL first secretary. The CCP organ channel ceased to play a significant role in this level of rank promotion – only 8.6 percent. This presumably results from the limited number of full-ministerial rank posts in the CCP central departments. 13 persons obtained rank promotions by being appointed as ministers of the State Council. However, only three of them went through the channel of technological and economic ministries.²³ As stated earlier, leading posts of these ministries are seldom accessible to

Table 7.1 Promotion channels to the vice-ministerial rank, 1978–2011

	<i>1978–1982</i>	<i>1983–1987</i>	<i>1988–1992</i>	<i>1993–1997</i>	<i>1998–2002</i>	<i>2003–2007</i>	<i>2008–2011</i>	<i>Total</i>
CCP organs	25.0% (2)	50.0% (11)	50.0% (9)	50.0% (22)	53.7% (44)	47.4% (37)	19.4% (6)	46.3% (131)
Mass organizations	50.0% (4)	9.1% (2)	5.6% (1)	6.8% (3)	8.5% (7)	6.4% (5)	3.2% (1)	8.1% (23)
PC/CPPCC			11.1% (2)	9.1% (4)	9.8% (8)	10.3% (8)	51.6% (16)	13.4% (38)
Provincial leaders	25.0% (2)	36.4% (8)	27.8% (5)	20.5% (9)	20.7% (17)	29.5% (23)	25.8% (8)	25.4% (72)
Technological and economic ministries					2.4% (2)	1.3% (1)		1.1% (3)
Other ministries		4.6% (1)	5.7% (1)	13.6% (6)	4.9% (4)	5.1% (4)		5.7% (16)
Total	100.0% (8)	100.1% (22)	100.1% (18)	100.0% (44)	100.0% (82)	100.0% (78)	100.0% (31)	100.0% (283)

Table 7.2 Promotion channels to the full-ministerial rank, 1978–2011

	<i>1978–1982</i>	<i>1983–1987</i>	<i>1988–1992</i>	<i>1993–1997</i>	<i>1998–2002</i>	<i>2003–2007</i>	<i>2008–2011</i>	<i>Total</i>
CCP organs				11.1% (1)	11.8% (2)	9.7% (3)	5.9% (1)	8.6% (7)
Mass organizations	50.0% (2)	66.7% (2)		11.1% (1)	11.8% (2)	6.5% (2)	17.6% (3)	14.8% (12)
PC/CPPCC				22.2% (2)	35.3% (6)	6.5% (2)	41.2% (7)	21.0% (17)
Provincial leaders	50.0% (2)			44.4% (4)	17.6% (3)	61.3% (19)	23.5% (4)	39.5% (32)
Technological and economic ministries					11.8% (2)		5.9% (1)	3.7% (3)
Other ministries		33.3% (1)		11.1% (1)	11.8% (2)	16.1% (5)	5.9% (1)	12.3% (10)
Total	100.0% (4)	100.0% (3)	(0)	99.9% (9)	100.1% (17)	100.1% (31)	100.0% (17)	99.9% (81)

political bureaucrats. This result is consistent with the recruitment patterns at the vice-ministerial level.

This finding strengthens the argument of elite dualism – functional differentiation and separate mobility paths among Chinese political elites.²⁴ This is due to the party-state’s need to achieve dual goals – preserving one-party rule and managing the economy. Having stronger educational credentials, technocrats usually worked in the government at various levels, especially in the ministries relevant to technology, planning, trade, management, finance, and economics.²⁵ This chapter further argues that Youth League affiliates, an important source of political bureaucrats, may head the CCP functional departments of the central and provincial levels, seize the posts of provincial party and governmental leaders, take charge of party-led national mass organizations, and even lead some ministries of the State Council.²⁶ However, they seldom have access to the posts suitable for technocrats. The duality of elite recruitment is not only reflected in the different weights of educational and political credentials, but also in the use of different promotion channels.

Ages at rank promotions

After discussing the promotion channels of Youth League affiliates, the focus moves to their average ages at the year of rank promotion. As Table 7.3 reveals, the average age of CCYL first secretary appointment (a full-ministerial level post) is 40.6 years old, while the other Youth League affiliates advanced to the same level at the age of 53.3 years old on average. The gap has consistently been greater than 10 years since the mid-1990s. In other words, cadres with the former experience can wait a much longer time for their next rank promotion than their Youth League fellows. The average age of CCYL executive secretary appointment (a vice-ministerial level post) is 40 years old, 7.9 years younger than that of the other Youth League affiliates. With the exception of the 1978–82 period, the age difference holds steady at 7–10 years.

Table 7.3 Average ages when obtaining rank promotion, 1978–2011

	<i>To the full-ministerial level</i>		<i>To the vice-ministerial level</i>	
	<i>CCYL first secretary</i>	<i>Other CCYL cadres</i>	<i>CCYL executive secretary</i>	<i>Other CCYL cadres</i>
1978–1982	42.0	45.8	49.0	44.4
1983–1987	40.5	42.7	36.0	43.5
1988–1992	n/a	n/a	n/a	47.6
1993–1997	38.0	51.8	39.5	46.7
1998–2002	38.8	54.5	41.0	48.0
2003–2007	43.0	53.7	38.5	48.8
2008–2011	41.0	55.8	41.0	50.9
Average	40.6	53.3	40.0	47.9

Although complete information is not available, some statistics show the age advantage Youth League affiliates have in comparison with nation-wide ranking cadres thereby revealing the dimension of “sponsored mobility” in Chinese elite politics.²⁷ For instance, from 1980–98, the annual age averages of ministers and vice-ministers in the State Council were between 63.9 and 55.5, while the variation ranged between 56.5 and 57.4 in the 1990s.²⁸ In the same period, the age averages of provincial party leadership were between 53.2 and 62.3, while the range was limited between 53.9 and 55.3 in the 1990s.²⁹ Another example is that, in 1998, only 2.2 percent were below the age of 45 years old and another 18.6 percent were between 46 years old and 54 years old.³⁰ A recent analysis of ranking cadres born in the 1960s reveals that these officials obtained their first vice-ministerial post at the age of 43.8 on average and advanced to the full-ministerial rank level at the age of 45.2 on average.³¹

These facts indicate that CCYL leading posts are fast tracks for rank promotion for young cadres. In post-reform China, age is a key factor in determining officials’ retirement and promotion, due to the policy of cadre rejuvenation (*ganbu nianqinghua*, 干部年轻化). An official who is younger in age possesses a strong political advantage in competing with others for the opportunity of rank promotion. Youth League affiliates generally have a stronger competitive advantage in age than nationwide ranking cadres. The higher the CCYL post an official holds, the stronger the age advantage he has. Such a competitive advantage then rewards their political careers in the years to come. Potential young cadres are appointed to leading posts in the CCYL so that they obtain a higher rank at a relatively young age. They are then transferred to the party, the government or mass organizations several years later. Their age advantage will give them better opportunities to receive another rank promotion than their colleagues without Youth League experience.

Hu Chunhua (胡春华) (born in 1963) is a typical example. Hu, a veteran of CCYL and Tibetan posts, was appointed as CCYL first secretary in December 2006 at the age of 43 – an age approaching the age limit of 45 for CCYL Secretariat members. In April 2008, he became the Governor of Hebei. He was the second oldest cadre at the time to assume the office of CCYL first secretary since 1982; however, his tenure was nearly the shortest, only several months longer than Hu Jintao’s. He was reassigned to the post of party secretary of Inner Mongolia in November 2009 and is now a promising frontrunner for the sixth generation leadership.³²

Connections and institutional role

The connection factor

After analyzing the upward mobility pattern of Youth League affiliates, this chapter moves to analyze their political rise. This chapter argues that connections with the top leadership and the CCYL’s institutional role as a cadre transmission belt to the party-state jointly result in the rise of Youth League

affiliates. It is apparent that connections are crucial to cadres' rank promotions. The existing literature has repeatedly emphasized the importance of connections/factions in Chinese elite politics in the past decades.³³ In order to consolidate his power base, a new leader usually elevates his men to hold strategically important leading posts in the state machine.³⁴ Accordingly, personnel reshufflings among ranking cadres are usually accompanied with the change of the top leadership.

Although it is difficult to directly observe patron-client relationships, which are the foundation of factions, one may identify connections instead. Connections turn into patron-client relationships through conscious cultivation by the actors involved. If a number of cadres having a similar type of connection with a leader are promoted during the latter's tenure of office, we can more confidently claim that these connections have become a patron-client relationship and affect cadres' promotions collectively. Among the various types of connections, shared working experience in the early days of their careers and long-term friendship are always important resources for a new top leader to filter out his men. If shared working experience in the CCYL is a key factor in elite mobility, one should be able to find that the upward mobility of Youth League affiliates accompanies the rise of a top leader with a Youth League background.

Chinese politics in the 1980s shows the fluctuation of Youth League affiliates' career development with power struggles in the CCP top leadership. In the early and mid-1980s, Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦), the CCYL first secretary from 1952–66, promoted many of his CCYL associates in order to expand his power base.³⁵ While most of these officials worked in the CCYL before the Cultural Revolution,³⁶ some Youth League affiliates under study received quick rank promotion to the full-ministerial level or above in several years, such as Li Ruihuan (李瑞环), Wang Zhaoguo (王兆国), Hu Jintao, and Jia Chunwang (贾春旺). As Figure 7.1 shows, from 1982–86, 25 officials advanced to the vice-ministerial rank and 6 persons seized posts at the full-ministerial rank.

In the late 1980s, Youth League affiliates suffered a political setback after Hu Yaobang and Hu Qili (胡启立) lost power. For instance, Wang Zhaoguo was removed from the CCP Secretariat and demoted to governor of Fujian. From 1987 to 1990, only eight persons advanced to the vice-ministerial rank—including one still serving as CCYL executive secretary—and one advanced to the full-ministerial rank. A major exception was Li Ruihuan, who became a member of the CCP Poliburo Standing Committee (PSC) in November 1989.

The invisible obstacle to Youth League affiliates' rank promotion was removed in 1991 when Deng Xiaoping prepared to rally his reform supporters against the conservatives in the CCP and re-energize his economic reform, which had lost its dynamism after the Tiananmen Incident of 1989. In June 1991, Hu Qili was appointed as vice-minister of the Machine-Building and Electronics Industry – his first post since he was deprived of a CCP PSC membership in 1989. From 1991 to 1992, 11 Youth League affiliates advanced to the vice-ministerial rank. Youth League affiliates increasingly received rank promotions after Hu Jintao entered the CCP top leadership in 1992.




Figure 7.1 The number of rank promotions, 1978–2011
 In the 1970s, several Youth League affiliates obtained the vice-ministerial rank before entering their Youth League tenure. They usually served in the Youth League and concurrently held a post of deputy head of a provincial revolutionary committee.

As Figure 7.1 shows, the number of their rank promotions increased periodically after the 1990s with the election of both the new leadership of the CCP and the State Council every five years. The tendency of Youth League affiliate promotion seems to be perfectly consistent with the connections/faction thesis. When Hu Jintao’s status as the head of the fourth generation leadership became consolidated, the number of Youth League affiliates advancing to the full-ministerial rank increased rapidly from 9 in the period 1993–97, to 17 in the period 1998–2002, and to 31 in the period 2003–7. From 2008 to 2011, 17 persons became full-ministerial rank cadres. In the same periods, the numbers of cadres receiving promotions to the vice-ministerial rank were 45, 79, 79, and 31, respectively.

Figure 7.2 also shows the political rise of Youth League elites. The posts of provincial party secretaries and governors have become an important training ground for national leaders.³⁷ The number of provincial party secretaries and governors who are Youth League affiliates also has increased with the pace of the succession of Hu Jintao to Jiang Zemin’s post as the top leader of the CCP. In March 1993, the number of governor and provincial party secretary posts occupied by Youth League affiliates was four. The number rapidly increased to 11 in March 1998, peaked at 29 in March 2003, and held relatively steady at 24 in March 2008 and 19 in March 2011. In other words,




Figure 7.2 The number of provincial leader posts held by Youth League affiliates

Youth League affiliates have held more than 30 percent of the 62 provincial party secretary and governor posts in the 2000s.

The institutional factor

Now, the institutional factor must be taken into account. As Lowell Dittmer claimed decades ago, the informal power base of a political leader is an accumulation of allies and followers shaped during his tour of duty in a series of formal positions. Some formal positions are better than others in establishing a strong informal power base.³⁸ Following this rationale, leadership posts in larger and politically more important organizations give a person more of a competitive edge than posts in smaller and less important organizations in terms of developing a strong and broad informal power base.

The CCYL definitely satisfies the standard of being “large and politically important” because of its organizational structure and the cadre transmission belt mission. First of all, the CCYL is a national mass organization whose bureaucratic structure and functional departments almost duplicate the CCP apparatus. The functional departments of the CCYL cover secretarial work, personnel, propaganda and united front work – all essential to the party apparatus’ daily operations. Due to its organizational size, the number of CCYL cadres ranking at the deputy-bureau level and above in a given time is more than 220 in total.³⁹ These attributes make the CCYL a good training ground for political bureaucrats and provide the infrastructure for its leaders in the center upon which extensive personal networks may develop throughout the country. Such cross-departmental/ministerial and cross-regional connections are essential to the formation of a generalist faction.⁴⁰

Other bureaucratic systems also provide the organizational basis of personal networks. These networks, however, are less extensive than Youth League affiliates' and less likely to sustain the formation of general factions. Take the so-called "Petro Gang" (石油帮) as an example, it is better classified as a "technocratic faction." Some may become cadres ranking at the full-ministerial level or higher, such as Zeng Qinghong (曾庆红), Zhou Yongkang (周永康), Wei Liucheng (卫留成), and Su Shulin (苏树林). Nevertheless, most members are usually specialists and spend their entire careers in the petroleum industry. They cannot be transferred to other branches of the party-state on a scale equivalent to the CCYL.

Second, interdependence between CCYL central leadership and provincial CCYL leaderships deepen their shared working experiences. On the one hand, the CCYL central leadership needs the support of its provincial leaderships to implement its youth policies and activities. As this chapter stated earlier, CCYL provincial committees are under the direct supervision of CCP provincial committees and the appointments and transfers of the formers' leading cadres are primarily decided by the latter. Unlike most bureaucratic systems, the CCYL lacks strong administrative instruments – personnel power – to carry out policies.

On the other hand, CCYL provincial leaderships need the assistance of the CCYL central leadership. Youth affairs are seldom a key task for CCP provincial leaders and CCYL provincial leaders are much younger and inexperienced than their party bosses.⁴¹ CCYL central leaders may provide CCYL provincial leaders opportunities, such as through their inspection visits of local youth affairs, to create an impression of good performance on their party bosses. Accordingly, cooperation and coordination is important in the interactions between CCYL central and provincial committees and then strengthens their personal connections. Youth League affiliates are also more likely to develop a sense of organizational identification through various symbolic or ceremonial instruments, such as Hu Yaobang's legacy and the official CCYL anthem, flag, and emblem.⁴²

Third, the CCYL's institutional role as a cadre transmission belt makes this organization politically important, even though the rank level of the CCYL first secretary is lower than that of the heads of the All-China Women's Federation (ACWF) and of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), which are concurrently occupied by an official ranking at the party and state leader level (*dang he guojia lingdaorenji*, 党和国家领导人级).⁴³ Most importantly, this unique official mission prevents the rise of Youth League affiliates from simply being treated as factionalism. The CCYL organization at all levels functions like a reservoir, continuously pooling potential young cadres with diversified origins, expertise and backgrounds, and blending them into a large mesh. These cadres primarily come from the local organs of the party, the government and the CCYL at one level lower but occasionally are recruited from universities, research institutes and state-owned enterprises. These cadres also have diversified educational backgrounds.⁴⁴ Most importantly,

the decisions on their appointment and transfer are made by the CCP, not by the CCYL itself. In other words, entry to the Youth League group is relatively open to young cadres in various provinces and with various backgrounds and is controlled by multiple gatekeepers, instead of a single gatekeeper. After being integrated into the Youth League networks, these young cadres are institutionally transferred to the party, the government, mass organizations or other institutions.

Ordinary factions such as the Shanghai group are not allocated the official mission of cadre supplier and thereby face restrictions in expansion. These factions cannot continuously absorb young cadres of different backgrounds and integrate them into their existing networks, as the CCYL does. Moreover, their solidarity is primarily based on loyalty to an individual leader. Once the leader is out of the picture, the entire faction may quickly fall apart. For example, it is difficult to imagine the next core of the Shanghai group once Jiang passes away. In comparison, when a leader of the Youth League group leaves, the entire network will continue functioning around the new leader. The three Hus (*san hu*, 三胡) in the CCYL – from Hu Yaobang, Hu Qili to Hu Jintao, are a typical example of this scenario. It won't be a surprise if another former CCYL first secretary, such as Li Keqiang (李克强) or even Hu Chunhua, replaces Hu Jintao as the core of the Youth League networks after Hu steps down in 2012.

In addition, ordinary factions cannot arrange for their members to occupy key posts on a large scale without facing resistance. For example, Jiang Zemin's efforts to transfer his men to provinces and major cities were far from successful, although he did arrange for many members of the Shanghai group to hold posts in the central CCP and Government.⁴⁵ As Figure 7.2 demonstrates, Youth League elites have no problem in this matter.

Youth League affiliates in Chinese politics in the next decade

As the previous section has claimed, the rise of the Youth League group results from both Hu Jintao's efforts to consolidate his power base and the CCYL's organizational mission of serving as a cadre transmission belt in the political establishment. The second factor is the main difference between this elite group and other factions. In light of this, what role will this elite group play in Chinese politics after the 18th Party Congress of the CCP in 2012? Which elites are more likely to become the members of the fifth and sixth generation leaderships? In addition to those Youth League elites who have a seat in the 17th Politburo and PSC of the CCP, this chapter will identify other members of this elite group who may join the CCP top leadership in the next decade. The results show that the Youth League group will remain crucial in decades to come.

In order to be active in politics for a longer period of time, an elite group must have new recruits from different political generations ready to hold a significant proportion of seats in the top decision-making body. Accordingly,

this chapter will identify Youth League affiliates who have the potential to obtain a seat in the fifth and sixth generation leaderships. The criteria to be used in filtering out potential candidates include Politburo membership, CCP CC membership, holding a full-ministerial level post, age limits, provincial leadership experience (provincial party secretary or governor), and cadre circulation experiences. These rules or norms are the institutional components of the cadre system that have gradually formed over the past decades.

In the 25-seat 17th Politburo of the CCP, 11 persons will be under the age limit of 68 years old in 2012. They are front-runners to become the 18th PSC members. Since 1987, most PSC civilian leaders have followed the pattern of step-by-step promotion. They hold a seat in the Politburo for several years before further advancing to the PSC. Only the designated successors of the general secretary and premier may skip the career stage of being a Politburo member and be elected directly to the PSC.⁴⁶ Among the 23 civilian PSC members from 1987 to 2011, there are only four exceptions to this rule – Hu Jintao, Zhu Rongji (朱镕基), Xi Jinping (习近平) and Li Keqiang. After the exclusion of Xi and Li, nine incumbent Politburo members satisfy the age requirement for re-election. Among them, four have a Youth League background. They are Li Yuanchao (李源潮), Wang Yang (汪洋), Liu Yunshan (刘云山), and Liu Yandong (刘延东). In other words, 45.5 percent of the 11 front-runners of the 18th PSC members are Youth League elites (See Table 7.4).⁴⁷

In conjunction with the other criteria mentioned earlier, the step-by-step promotion pattern can be used to filter out the possible front-runners to become the 18th Politburo members. This task can be done with a lower degree of precision due to the lack of some key factors, such as health conditions and performance evaluations. Since 1987, the absolute majority of Politburo members has held a Central Committee membership and has held a full-ministerial rank post for several years before obtaining a seat in the Politburo. Among the 28 possible candidates who may advance to the Politburo member level for the first time in 2012,⁴⁸ 46.4 percent (13 persons) belong to the Youth League group. They are Ling Jihua (令计划), Hu Chunhua, Zhou Qiang (周强), Ji Bingxuan (吉炳轩), Liu Qibao (刘奇葆), Han Changfu (韩长赋), Song Xiuyan (宋秀岩), Zhang Baoshun (张宝顺), Yuan Chunqing (袁纯清), Zhang Qingli (张庆黎), Qiang Wei (强卫), Yang Jing (杨晶), and Han Zheng (韩正) (See Table 7.4). Although it is unlikely that these Youth League affiliates will all advance to the Politburo in 2012, the strength of this elite group in the next several years is confirmed.⁴⁹

Youth League affiliates also comprise a significant share of the ranking cadres of the younger generation. For example, in 2011, only seven full-ministerial rank officials were born in the 1960s. They are promising front-runners for the collective leadership of the sixth generation. 42.9 percent of the seven officials have Youth League backgrounds and all are former or incumbent CCYL first secretaries – Hu Chunhua (born in April 1963; party secretary of Inner Mongolia, 2009–12; Politburo members and party secretary of Guangdong, 2012–present), Zhou Qiang (born in April 1960; party secretary of Hunan,

Table 7.4 Front-runners to the party leadership with Youth League backgrounds

<i>Name</i>	<i>DOB</i>	<i>Current posts</i>	<i>Highest CCYL post</i>
Front-runners of 18th PSC membership			
Li Keqiang	1955/6	PSC member, executive vice-premier	CCYL first secretary
Liu Yandong	1945/11	Politburo member, state councilor	CCYL executive secretary
Liu Yunshan	1947/7	Politburo member, head of CCP Central Propaganda Department	CCYL deputy secretary of Inner Mongolia
Li Yuanchao	1950/11	Politburo member, head of CCP Central Organization Department	CCYL Central Secretariat member
Wang Yang	1955/3	Politburo member, party secretary of Guangdong	CCYL deputy secretary of Anhui
Possible front-runners of 18th Politburo membership			
Zhang Baoshun	1950/2	Party secretary of Anhui	CCYL executive secretary
Zhang Qingli	1951/11	Party secretary of Tibet	Deputy director of CCYL Central Youth Workers and Peasants Department
Ji Bingxuan	1951/11	Party secretary of Heilongjiang	CCYL Central Secretariat member
Yuan Chunqing	1952/3	Party secretary of Shanxi	CCYL Central Secretariat member
Liu Qibao	1953/1	Party secretary of Sichuan	CCYL Standing Committee member, CCYL secretary of Anhui
Qiang Wei	1953/3	Party secretary of Qinghai	CCYL secretary of Beijing
Yang Jing	1953/12	Director of State Ethnic Affairs Commission	CCYL secretary of Inner Mongolia
Han Zheng	1954/4	Mayor of Shanghai	CCYL secretary of Shanghai
Han Changfu	1954/10	Minister of Agriculture	CCYL Standing Committee member, Director of CCYL Central Youth Peasants Department
Song Xiuyan	1955/10	First secretary and vice-chairman of the All-China Women's Federation	CCYL secretary of Qinghai
Ling Jihua	1956/10	Director of the General Office of the CCP CC	CCYL Standing Committee member, Director of CCYL Central Propaganda Department
Zhou Qiang	1960/4	Party secretary of Hunan	CCYL first secretary
Hu Chunhua	1963/4	Party secretary of Inner Mongolia	CCYL first secretary

2010–2013; president of the Supreme People’s Court, 2013–present) and Lu Hao (born in June 1967; CCYL first secretary, 2008–2013; governor of Heilongjiang, 2013–present) (See Table 7.5).⁵⁰ Youth League affiliates also hold a significant share of the vice-ministerial rank cadres of the younger generation. Among the 171 younger generation officials collected by the Chinese Political Elite Database (last updated in 2011), 17.5 percent are Youth League affiliates. If one excludes those young vice-ministerial rank cadres without CCP membership due to the fact that they cannot obtain a seat in the CCP decision-making body, the proportion of Youth League affiliates increases 21.3 percent. Table 7.5 further reveals the political advantage held by this elite group – the share of Youth League affiliates in a certain rank level increases with the rank level. Therefore, Youth League affiliates occupy a higher percentage of posts at the higher rank levels than at the lower rank levels.

Conclusion

This chapter attempts to solve four puzzles regarding the political rise of Youth League affiliates. What are the attributes of their mobility patterns? What factors are crucial to their rise? To what extent does this elite group differ from other factions? Will its political influence continue in the post-Hu Jintao era? By analyzing the upward mobility of nearly 300 Youth League elites in terms of promotion channels and ages at the year of rank promotion, this chapter presents two mobility attributes. First, they seldom obtain rank promotion by holding posts suitable to technocrats. This elite group is best labeled as a main source of political bureaucrats. Second, they are sent by the party to assume CCYL leading posts at the middle rank or above at a relatively young age. This advantage gives them a much longer waiting period for next rank promotion.

Both connections to the top leadership and the mission of a cadre transmission belt to the party-state are crucial to the political rise of Youth League affiliates. In order to consolidate his power base, Hu Jintao arranges for his Youth League confidants to occupy key posts, particularly as provincial party secretaries and governors. The organizational mission of the CCYL gives the Youth League group a status of having endless supplies of new recruits and legally transferring young cadres to other branches of the party-state. This factor also makes this elite group different from other factions and bureaucratic systems because the CCYL organizational structure provides the infrastructure

Table 7.5 Full-ministerial and vice-ministerial rank officials born in the 1960s

	<i>Full-ministerial rank</i>	<i>Vice-ministerial rank</i>
Youth League elites	42.9% (3)	17.5% (30)
Other elites with CCP membership	57.1% (4)	64.9% (111)
Others elites without CCP membership	(0)	17.5% (30)
Total	100.0% (7)	99.9% (171)

* The numbers and percentages were calculated by the author.

for its central leaders to develop networks throughout the country. The legal status of the CCYL also contributes to the formation of group identification among Youth League affiliates.

As this chapter has stated, a significant proportion of the front-runners to become 18th Politburo members and PSC members belongs to the Youth League group. This elite group even comprises a significant share of the ranking cadres born after 1960. Consequently, in contrast with the decline of other factions after their factional leaders have stepped down, the political influence of the Youth League group is more likely to last in the post-Hu era, regardless of changes in the CCP central leadership.

Notes

- 1 For a detailed description of the CCYL's responsibility on youth affairs, see "Gongqingtuan zhongyang jigou gaige fangan," issued by the CCP on March 31, 1995. Quoted from Ximing Zou, ed., *Zhonggong zhongyang jigou yange shilu: 1921.7–1997.9* (Beijing: Zhongguo dang'an chubanshe, 1998), pp. 210–11.
- 2 Jiahua Li and Wanhu Chen, eds, *Xinshiji xinjiedian gongqingtuan gongzuo he jianshe quanshu*, vol. 1 (Jilin: Jilin chubanshe, 2003), p. 7.
- 3 Lin Gan, "Gongqingtuan ganbu de jiaose xuanze yu wuxing peiyang," *Guangxi qingnian ganbu xueyuan xuebao*, vol. 9, no. 5 (October 1999): p. 32.
- 4 These statistics were obtained from the official CCYL website, accessed April 2, 2011, http://www.gqt.org.cn/695/gqt_tuanshi/gqt_ghlc/tdjs/
- 5 See Ximing Zou, ed., *Zhonggong zhongyang jigou yange shilu*, p. 210. For a list of leaders in charge of youth affairs in the CCP Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), the Politburo and the Secretariat, see Wang Ding, *Hu Jintao yu gongqingtuan jiebanqun* (Hong Kong: Dangdai mingjia chubanshe, 2005), p. 135.
- 6 For example, Mao Zedong handpicked Hu Yaobang to lead the CCYL in September 1952 and Hua Guofeng selected Han Ying in October 1978. Fangliu Ni, "Jujiao gongqingtuan zhongyang diyishuji," *Lingdao wencui*, no. 6 (March 2009): p. 68.
- 7 Xiuxue Zhang, Huiliang Lai, and Ruiting Hao, eds, *Zhongguo gongchanzhuyi qingniantuan gongzuo dabaike* (Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1993), pp. 28–30.
- 8 Shiguang She, ed., *Dangdai zhongguo de qingnian he gongqingtuan*, vol. 2 (Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe, 1998), p. 55.
- 9 Xiuxue Zhang, Huiliang Lai, and Ruiting Hao, eds, *Zhongguo gongchanzhuyi qingniantuan gongzuo dabaike*, p. 29.
- 10 For example, Changzhong Zheng treated all cadres who have ever held a post in the CCYL as Youth League affiliates, regardless of whether their posts were at the grassroots level or whether they served in the league before 1949. This loose definition inevitably increases the number of Youth League affiliates on a large scale. See Changzhong Zheng, *Zuzhi ziben yu zhengdang yanxu: zhongguo gongqingtuan zhengzhi gongneng de yige kaocha shiye*, Ph.D. dissertation, Fudan University, 2005. Zhiyue Bo defined Youth League affiliates as those cadres who have occupied a leading post at the deputy division level (*fuchuji*, 副处级) and above. See Zhiyue Bo, "Paths to the Top Leadership in China: The Case of Provincial Leaders," presented at International Conference on Elites and Governance in China, November 6–7, 2010, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan, p. 14.
- 11 Cheng Li, "Hu's Policy Shift and the Tuanpai's Coming-of-Age," *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 15 (Summer 2005): p. 2; Cheng Li, "Reshuffling Four Tiers of Local

- Leaders: Goals and Implications,” *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 18 (Spring 2006): p. 11.
- 12 Of course, no definition is perfect. Some Youth League affiliates who are widely treated as Hu Jintao’s men are excluded from analysis. An example is Ye Kedong (叶克冬) (deputy director of the Taiwan Affairs Office). He was Hu Jintao’s secretary from 1982 to 1990.
 - 13 David C. Schwartz, “Toward a Theory of Political Recruitment,” *Western Political Quarterly*, vol. 22, no. 3 (September 1969): p. 552.
 - 14 Lester G. Seligman, “Elite Recruitment and Political Development,” *Journal of Politics*, vol. 26, no. 3 (August 1964): pp. 612–13.
 - 15 The CCP organ channel refers to heads and deputies of CCP central departments, and standing committee members of provincial CCP committees. These standing committee members usually take charge of the General Office, the departments of Organization, Propaganda, and United Front Work, the Commission for Discipline Inspection, or the Commission for Politics and Law Enforcement (zhengfawei, 政法委).
 - 16 The mass organization channel includes leading posts of major party-led mass organizations, such as the Youth League, All-China Federation of Trade Unions, All-China Women’s Federation, etc. These organizations are in the domain of the United Front Work Department.
 - 17 The provincial leader channel is limited to heads and deputies of CCP provincial committees and governments, as well as party secretaries and mayors of sub-provincial cities.
 - 18 The PC/CPPCC channel refers to leading posts in the national or provincial organs of the two organizations. Directors and deputy directors of their special committees are not taken into account.
 - 19 Technocrats have technical science and economics and management training (or degrees) and professional occupations. Political bureaucrats are defined as those who spend most of their careers dealing with affairs relevant to secretarial work, personnel, propaganda, united front work, party discipline, politics and law enforcement. Some ministries in the State Council handle professional affairs and need technocrats to head these ministries. The leading posts in these ministries are not accessible to political bureaucrats. Leadership positions in some other ministries in the State Council are much more attainable for political bureaucrats because these ministries manage tasks less relevant to technical science, economics and management. Leading cadres in these ministries may be transferred back and forth between the CCP’s functional departments of the central and provincial levels or even concurrently hold a position in these CCP functional departments. For example, Cai Fuchao (蔡赴朝) was appointed as a vice-minister of the Department of Propaganda of the CCP and the director of the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television in March 2011. Yin Weimin (尹蔚民) is a vice-minister of the Department of Organization of the CCP and head of the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. For the definition of technocrats, see Cheng Li, *China’s Leaders: The New Generation* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), p. 27.
 - 20 The rank of political leaders is excluded. CCP and State Council leaders cover a much wider range of duties than officials at the full-ministerial level and may have decision-making posts in both institutions. It would be difficult to classify them into technocrats and political bureaucrats. They are more appropriately labeled as generalists, rather than specialists. Leaders of the national organ of the PC and the CPPCC play primarily ceremonial roles in Chinese politics.
 - 21 These three cadres are Pan Yue (潘岳) (deputy director of the Economic Restructuring Office of the State Council, January 2000-March 2003), Pu Changcheng (蒲长城) (deputy director of the General Administration of Quality Supervision,

160 *Chien-wen Kou*

- Inspection and Quarantine, March 2001-present), and Zhang Jingan (张景安) (president of Science and Technology Daily, April 2005-December 2010).
- 22 See, for example, Chien-wen Kou, “Hou wenge shiqi gongqingtuan lingdao ganbu zai zhonggong dang zheng qun xitong de fazhan,” in *Xinshiji de zhongguo*, ed. Chou-Mei Chen, (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 2002), pp. 44–47; Chien-wen Kou, “Hu Jintao shidai tuanxi ganbu de jueqi: paixi kaoliang vs. ganbu shusong de zuzhi renwu,” *Yuanjing jijinhui jikan*, vol. 6, no. 4 (October 2007): pp. 68–72.
 - 23 They are Li Changjiang (李长江) (director of the State Administration of Quality Supervision and Quarantine, March 2001-September 2008), Zhang Weiqing (张维庆) (minister-in-charge of the State Family Planning Commission, March 1998–March 2008), and Zhi Shuping (支树平) (director of the State Administration of Quality Supervision and Quarantine, August 2010-present).
 - 24 Some examples are Xiaowei Zang, “The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?” *Asian Survey*, vol. 43, no. 8 (August 1993): pp. 801–3; Andrew G. Walder, “Political Mobility and the Communist Political Order,” *American Sociological Review*, vol. 60, no. 3 (June 1995): pp. 309–28; Xiaowei Zang, “Educational Credentials, Elite Dualism, and Elite Stratification in China,” *Sociological Perspectives*, vol. 44, no. 2 (Summer 2001): pp. 189–205; Xiaowei Zang, *Elite Dualism and Leadership Selection in China* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).
 - 25 A study has indicated that economic technocrats are usually transferred within these professional offices and state-owned enterprises and banks. See Chien-wen Kou and Fang-yu Chen, “1978 nian yihou zhonggong caijing gaoguan de shitu liudong: tezheng yu qushi,” *Zhengzhi xuebao*, no. 47 (June 2009): pp. 59–103.
 - 26 Cheng Li and David Shambaugh also noted this point. See Cheng Li, “University Networks and the Rise of Qinghua Graduates in China’s Leadership,” *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, no. 32 (July 1994): p. 28; David Shambaugh, “The Dynamics of Elite Politics during the Jiang Era,” *China Journal*, no. 45 (January 2001): p. 107.
 - 27 Sponsored mobility refers to “involved controlled selection in which the elite or their agents choose recruits early and carefully induct them into elite status.” See Ralph H. Turner, “Sponsored and Contest Mobility and the School System,” *American Sociological Review*, vol. 25, no. 6 (December 1960): p. 855.
 - 28 Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu, *Dangzheng lingdaoganbu tongji ziliao huibian* (1954–1998) (Beijing: Dangjian wenwu chubanshe, 1999), p. 12.
 - 29 Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu, *Dangzheng lingdaoganbu tongji ziliao huibian*, p. 15.
 - 30 Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu, *Dangzheng lingdaoganbu tongji ziliao huibian*, p. 6.
 - 31 Junsheng Liu, “‘60 hou’ shengbuji ganbu chengzhang fenxi: you liu da congzheng lujing,” *Xinhuanet*, June 26, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008-06/26/content_8441889.htm
 - 32 Hu Chunhua became a Politburo member, one of the only two born after 1960 among the newly elected 25-person CCP leadership, after the 18th CCP Party Congress in November 2012 and was appointed as party secretary of Guangdong in December of the same year.
 - 33 There are numerous studies on factions in Chinese politics. A recent example is Victor Shih, *Factions and Finance in China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). For a general review of the literature on factions in Chinese politics, see Chien-wen Kou, *Zhonggong jingying zhengzhi de yanbian: zhiduhua yu quanli zhuanyi, 1978–2010*, 3rd edn. (Taipei: Wunan, 2010), pp. 22–33.
 - 34 In non-democratic regimes, political succession can be divided into the stages of succession transition and succession consolidation. In the first stage the successor takes over the official posts of his predecessor and the second stage is a process of power consolidation. See David Backman, “Succession, Consolidation, and

- Transition in China's Future," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, vol. 15, no. 1 (Spring 1996): p. 90.
- 35 Ling Ma and Ming Li, *Hu Jintao* (Hong Kong: Mingbao chubanshe, 2002), p. 133. In the 1980s, cadres' attitudes toward Deng Xiaoping's reform policy were crucial to their demotion and promotion. Within the parameters of this recruitment standard, Hu expanded his power base by appointing his CCYL followers to key posts.
- 36 Chien-wen Kou, "Hou wenge shiqi gongqingtuan lingdao ganbu zai zhonggong dang zheng qun xitong de fazhan," p. 60. They were excluded from analysis in this chapter because their Youth League tenure ended before 1978.
- 37 Cheng Li, "After Hu, Who? – China's Provincial Leaders in Await Promotion," *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 1 (Winter 2002), http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/clm1_CL.pdf After 1987, the share of first-time elected leaders with experience as provincial party secretary or governor in the Politburo has ranged from 50 percent to 87.5 percent, while that of the PSC has varied between 50 percent and 100 percent. See Chien-wen Kou, "Maixiang quanli hexin zhi lu: 1978 nian yihou zhonggong wenren lingxiu de zhengzhi liudong," *Zhengzhi kexue luncong*, no. 45 (September 2010): pp. 14–15, 25–26.
- 38 Lowell Dittmer, "Bases of Power in China: A Theory and Analysis of the Fall of the 'Gang of Four'," *World Politics*, vol. 31, no. 1 (October 1978): pp. 28–40.
- 39 This rough estimation is based on the CCYL's personnel regimentation. See *Gongqingtuan zhongyang zuzhibu, Zhongguo gongchanzhuyi qingniantuan zuzhi gongzuo tiaoli* (Beijing: Gongqingtuan zhongyang zuzhibu, 1984), p. 17.
- 40 Victor Shih divides factions into two types – general factions and technocratic factions. For their definitions, see Victor Shih, *Factions and Finance in China*, pp. 54–58.
- 41 Qingwen Ren, "Lun gongqingtuan ganbu de si da tedian," *Beijing qingnian zhengzhi xueyuan xuebao*, vol. 1, no. 4 (December 1999): pp. 74–76.
- 42 For Hu's legacy in the CCYL, see Fangliu Ni, "Juji gongqingtuan zhongyang diyishuji," p. 67.
- 43 For example, President of ACWF Chen Zhili (陈至立) was a former state councilor and minister of Education and is now a deputy head of National People's Congress. President of ACFTU Wang Zhaoguo currently serves as a CCP Politburo member and a deputy head of National People's Congress. Their rank level is higher than CCYL First Secretary Lu Hao (陆昊) – an official at the full-ministerial rank level.
- 44 For example, in the incumbent CCYL central leadership, First Secretary Lu Hao was a vice-mayor of Beijing and had led a textile state-owned enterprise and the Beijing-based Zhongguancun Science and Technology Park. Executive Secretary Wang Xiao (王晓) has been working in the CCYL since 1995. He Junke (贺军科) headed a research institute in the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corp before joining the CCYL Secretariat. Lu Yongzheng (卢雍政) and Zhou Changkui (周长奎) are veterans of youth affairs and had been working in the CCYL for many years when they became CCYL Secretariat members. Wang Hongyan (汪鸿雁) and Luo Mei (罗梅) have provincial CCYL working experiences and mayor/county chief experiences. The educational background of these seven cadres is also diverse. Their undergraduate majors include aerospace, physics, economics, Chinese literature, law and sociology.
- 45 See Cheng Li, "Political Localism Versus Institutional Restraints: Elite Recruitment in the Jiang Era," in *Holding China Together: Diversity and Integration in the Post-Deng Era*, eds. Barry J. Naughton and Dali L. Yang (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 45–46.
- 46 For a detailed discussion of step-by step promotion, see Chien-wen Kou, *Zhonggong jingying zhengzhi de yanbian*, pp. 296–305.

162 *Chien-wen Kou*

- 47 Bo Xilai is counted as one of the nine persons. But as we all know, he in fact had no chance to be promoted to the PSC after March 2012. Liu Yunshan was the only one successfully advancing to the PSC while Li Yuanchao, Wang Yang and Liu Yandong retain their seats in the Politburo. The first two are still qualified to be candidates of the PSC in 2017.
- 48 For the names of these 28 persons and the detailed procedure of how they were determined, see Chien-wen Kou, “Maixiang quanli hexin zhi lu,” pp. 6–16.
- 49 In the 18th Party Congress in November 2012, four of them advanced to the party and state leader level, including three Politburo members and a Secretariat member.
- 50 The four ranking officials without Youth League experiences are Nuer Bekri (努尔·白克力) (born in August 1961; chairman of Xinjiang Autonomous Region People’s Government, 2008–present); Zhang Qingwei (张庆伟) (born in November 1961; chairman of China Commercial Aircraft Co., Ltd., 2008–present); Sun Zhengcai (孙政才) (born in September 1963; party secretary of Jilin, 2009–12; Politburo member and party secretary of Chongchin, 2012–present); and Su Shulin (born in March 1962, governor of Fujian, 2011–present).

Bibliography

- Backman, David. 1996. “Succession, Consolidation, and Transition in China’s Future,” *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, vol. 15, no. 1 (Spring): 89–106.
- Bo, Zhiyue. 2010. “Paths to the Top Leadership in China: The Case of Provincial Leaders”, presented at *International Conference on Elites and Governance in China*, November 6–7, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan.
- Ding, Wang (丁望). 2005. *Hu Jintao yu gongqingtuan jiebanqun* (胡锦涛与共青团接班群, Hu Jintao and the successors from the CCYL). Hong Kong: Dangdai mingjia chubanshe.
- Dittmer, Lowell. 1978. “Bases of Power in China: A Theory and Analysis of the Fall of the ‘Gang of Four’,” *World Politics*, vol. 31, no. 1 (October): 26–60.
- Gan, Lin (甘霖). 1999. “Gongqingtuan ganbu de jiaose xuanze yu wuxing peiyang” (共青团干部的角色选择与悟性培养, Youth League cadres’ role selection and cultivation of comprehension), *Guangxi qingnian ganbu xuexuan xuebao* (广西青年干部学院学报, Journal of Guanxi Youth Cadre College), vol. 9, no. 5 (October): 32–33.
- Gongqingtuan zhongyang zuzhibu (共青团中央组织部, CCYL Central Organization Department). 1984. *Zhongguo gongchanzhuyi qingniantuan zuzhi gongzuo tiaoli* (中国共产主义青年团组织工作条例, CCYL regulations on personnel affairs). Beijing: Gongqingtuan zhongyang zuzhibu.
- Kou, Chien-wen (寇健文). 2002. “Hou wenge shiqi gongqingtuan lingdao ganbu zai zhonggong dang zheng qun xitong de fazhan” (后文革时期共青团领导干部在中共党政群系统的发展, The career path of CCYL cadres in Chinese party-state in the post-Cultural Revolution era). In *Xinshiji de Zhongguo* (新世纪的中国, China in the new century), edited by Chou-Mei Chen (陈侔美), 29–69. Taipei: Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University.
- . 2007. “Hu Jin tao shidai tuanxi ganbu de jueq: paixi kaoliang vs. ganbu shusong de zuzhi renwu” (胡锦涛时代团系干部的崛起: 派系考量 vs. 干部输送的组织任务, CCYL cadres rising in the era of Hu Jintao: factional networks vs. organizational mission), *Yuanjing jijinhui jikan* (远景基金会季刊, Prospect Foundation Quarterly), vol. 6, no. 4 (October): 49–95.
- . 2010. *Zhonggong jingying zhengzhi de yanbian: Zhiduhua yu quanli zhuan yi, 1978–2010* (中共菁英政治的演变: 制度化与权力转, 1978 – 2010, The evolution of

- Chinese elite politics: institutionalization and power transfer, 1978–2010), 3rd edn. Taipei: Wunan.
- 2010. “Maixiang quanli hexin zhi lu: 1978 nian yihou zhonggong wenren lingxiu de zhengzhi liudong” (迈向权力核心之路: 1978年以后中共文人领袖的政治流动, Paths to the top: the political mobility of Chinese civilian leaders after 1987), *Zhengzhi kexue luncong* (政治科学论丛, Political Science Review), no. 45 (September): 1–36.
- Kou, Chien-wen (寇健文) and Fang-yu Chen (陈方隅). 2009. “1978 nian yihou zhonggong caijing gaoguan de shitu liudong: tezheng yu qushi” (1978年以后中共财经高官的仕途流动: 特征与趋势, The political mobility of Chinese economic technocrats since 1978: characteristics and trends), *Zhengzhi xuebao* (政治学报, Chinese Political Science Review), no. 47 (June): 59–103.
- Li, Cheng. 1994. “University Networks and the Rise of Qinghua Graduates in China’s Leadership,” *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, no. 32 (July): 1–30.
- 2001. *China’s Leaders: The New Generation*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- 2002. “After Hu, Who? – China’s Provincial Leaders in Await Promotion,” *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 1 (Winter), http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/clm1_CL.pdf
- 2004. “Political Localism versus Institutional Restraints: Elite Recruitment in the Jiang Era.” In *Holding China Together: Diversity and Integration in the Post-Deng Era*, edited by Barry J. Naughton and Dali L. Yang, 29–69. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- 2005. “Hu’s Policy Shift and the Tuanpai’s Coming-of-Age,” *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 15, (Summer), http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/clm15_lc.pdf
- 2006. “Reshuffling Four Tiers of Local Leaders: Goals and Implications,” *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 18 (Spring), http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/clm18_cl.pdf
- Li, Jiahua (李家华) and Wanhu Chen (陈万虎), eds. 2003. *Xinshiji xinjieduan gongqingtuan gongzuo he jianshe quanshu* (新世纪新阶段共青团工作和建设全书, An encyclopedia on CCYL work and construction in the new century and the new stage), vol. 1. Jilin: Jilin chubanshe.
- Liu, Junsheng (刘俊生). 2008. “‘60 hou’ shengbuji ganbu chengzhang fenxi: you liu da congzheng lujing” (60后省部级干部成长分析: 有六大从政路径, An analysis of ministerial rank cadres who were born in the 1960s: six major paths to becoming officials), *Xinhuanet* (新华网), June 26, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008-06/26/content_8441889.htm
- Ma, Ling (马玲) and Ming Li (李铭). 2002. *Hu Jintao* (胡锦涛, Hu Jintao). Hong Kong: Mingbao chubanshe.
- Ni, Fangliu (倪方六). 2009. “Jujiao gongqingtuan zhongyang diyishuji” (聚焦共青团中央第一书记, Focusing on CCYL First Secretaries), *Lingdao wencui* (领导文萃, Leadership Collectanea), no. 6 (March): 66–71.
- Ren, Qingwen (任庆文). 1999. “Lun gongqingtuan ganbu de si da tedian” (论共青团干部的四大特点, On improving the four characteristics possessed by CCYL cadres), *Beijing qingnian zhengzhi xueyuan xuebao* (北京青年政治学院学报, Journal of Beijing Youth Politics College), vol. 1, no. 4 (December): 74–77.
- Schwartz, David C. 1969. “Toward a Theory of Political Recruitment,” *Western Political Quarterly*, vol. 22, no. 3 (September): 552–71.
- Seligman, Lester G. 1964. “Elite Recruitment and Political Development,” *Journal of Politics*, vol. 26, no. 3 (August): 612–26.

- Shambaugh, David. 2001. "The Dynamics of Elite Politics during the Jiang Era," *China Journal*, no. 45 (January): 101–11.
- She, Shiguang (佘世光), ed. 1998. *Dangdai zhongguo de qingnian he gongqingtuan* (当代中国的青年与共青团, Youths in contemporary China and the Youth League), vol. 2. Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe.
- Shih, Victor. 2008. *Factions and Finance in China*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tuner, Ralph H. 1960. "Sponsored and Contest Mobility and the School System," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 25, no. 6 (December): 855–67.
- Walder, Andrew G. 1995. "Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 60, no. 3 (June): 309–28.
- Zang, Xiaowei. 1993. "The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?" *Asian Survey*, vol. 43, no. 8 (August): 787–803.
- 2001. "Educational Credentials, Elite Dualism, and Elite Stratification in China," *Sociological Perspectives*, vol. 44, no. 2 (Summer): 189–205.
- 2004. *Elite Dualism and Leadership Selection in China*. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
- Zhang, Xiuxue (张修学), Huiliang Lai (赖辉亮), and Ruiting Hao (郝瑞庭), eds. 1993. *Zhongguo gongchanzhuyi qingniantuan gongzuo dabaike* (中国共产主义青年团工作大百科, An encyclopedia of the works of the CCYL). Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe.
- Zheng, Changzhong (郑长忠). 2005. "Zuzhi ziben yu zhengdang yanxu: zhongguo gongqingtuan zhengzhi gongneng de yige kaocha shijiao" (组织资本与政党延续: 中国共青团政治功能的一个考察视角, Organizational capital and the continuity of a political party: an observational perspective to understand the political functions of the CCYL). Ph.D. dissertation, Fudan University.
- Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu (中共中央组织部). 1999. *Dangzheng lingdaoganbu tongji ziliao huibian (1954–1998)* (党政领导干部统计资料汇编 (1954–58)), Collection of statistical data on party and governmental leading cadres (1954–98). Beijing: Dangjian wenwu chubanshe.
- Zou, Ximing (邹锡明), ed. 1998. *Zhonggong zhongyang jigou yange shilu: 1921.7–1997.9* (中共中央机构沿革实录: 1921.7–1997.9, An historical record of CCP central institutions: from July 1921 to September 1997). Beijing: Zhongguo dangan chubanshe.